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Efect of restricting the legal supply of prescription opioids on 
buying through online illicit marketplaces: interrupted time series 
analysis
James Martin,1 Jack Cunlife,2 David Décary-Hétu,3 Judith Aldridge4
Abstract
Objective
To examine the efect on the trade in opioids through 
online illicit markets (“cryptomarkets”) of the US 
Drug Enforcement Administration’s ruling in 2014 to 
reschedule hydrocodone combination products.
Design
Interrupted time series analysis.
Setting
31 of the world’s largest cryptomarkets operating from 
October 2013 to July 2016.
Main outcome measures
The proportion of total transactions, advertised and 
active listings for prescription opioids, prescription 
sedatives, prescription steroids, prescription 
stimulants, and illicit opioids, and the composition 
of the prescription opioid market between the US and 
elsewhere.
Results
The sale of prescription opioids through US 
cryptomarkets increased ater the schedule change, 
with no statistically signiicant changes in sales 
of prescription sedatives, prescription steroids, 
prescription stimulants, or illicit opioids. In July 
2016 sales of opioids through US cryptomarkets 
represented 13.7% of all drug sales (95% conidence 
interval 11.5% to 16.0%) compared with a modelled 
estimate of 6.7% of all sales (3.7% to 9.6%) had the 
new schedule not been introduced. This corresponds 
to a 4 percentage point yearly increase in the amount 
of trade that prescription opioids represent in the 
US market, set against no corresponding changes 
for comparable products or for prescription opioids 
sold outside the US. This change was irst observed 
for sales, and later observed for product availability. 
There was also a change in the composition of the 
prescription opioid market: fentanyl was the least 
purchased product during July to September 2014, 
then the second most frequently purchased by July 
2016.
Conclusions
The scheduling change in hydrocodone combination 
products coincided with a statistically signiicant, 
sustained increase in illicit trading of opioids through 
online US cryptomarkets. These changes were not 
observed for other drug groups or in other countries. A 
subsequent move was observed towards the purchase 
of more potent forms of prescription opioids, 
particularly oxycodone and fentanyl.
Introduction
Since 1999, deaths from overdose in the United States 
have quadrupled,1 in large part due to the over-supply 
of opioid analgesics.2 3 Recent evidence suggests that 
a “supply-side” approach—to limit the legal supply of 
these products—might have some utility, with research 
showing a reduction in the number of prescriptions 
issued for opioid analgesics in the United States 
between 2010 and 2015.4 Although the legitimate 
supply of opioids might have decreased, overall 
consumption will remain unchanged if users decide to 
source their drugs from illicit markets rather than from 
pharmacies.
The general eicacy of supply side interventions 
in drug markets is, however, under-researched.5 
Although understanding has been limited by a lack 
of detailed information connected to illicit drug 
supply, knowledge has improved in recent years 
with the emergence of online illicit marketplaces, or 
“cryptomarkets.” These cryptomarkets share many 
characteristics with legal online marketplaces such 
as eBay, including the provision of a decentralised 
digital marketplace in which geographically disparate 
vendors create “seller pages” to advertise goods for 
sale, and the use of customer feedback scores to 
rank sellers in terms of perceived product quality 
and service.6-8 Cryptomarkets facilitate anonymous 
use through their “darknet” location and payment by 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.7-9
The internet has facilitated the sale of licit and 
illicit drugs for more than 15 years,10-13 but when the 
irst cryptomarket, Silk Road 1, came online in 2011, 
illicit drugs began to be traded in large quantities. 
The annual turnover of drug sales conducted through 
cryptomarkets is estimated to be in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars,14 with most transactions involving 
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WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC
The over-supply of opioid analgesics has contributed to the quadrupling of 
deaths from overdose in the United states since 1999
Limiting the legal supply of these drugs through the US Drug Enforcement 
Administration’s ruling in 2014 to reschedule hydrocodone combination 
products, narrowed the circumstances in which opioids could be prescribed and 
stopped automatic repeat prescriptions
There are concerns that opioid users will source their drugs from illicit markets 
(cryptomarkets) rather than from pharmacies
WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS
The proportion of US cryptomarket drug trade attributable to prescription opioids 
increased immediately ater the schedule change, with no statistically signiicant 
changes in other drug categories
The composition of the prescription opioid supply on cryptomarkets also 
changed, with fentanyl being the least purchased drug in July to September 
2014, then the second most frequently purchased drug by July 2016
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recreational drugs (eg, cannabis, “ecstasy”). Before 
2014, prescription drugs represented slightly less 
than 10% of all cryptomarket sales.14 15 People 
who buy through cryptomarkets are believed to be 
predominantly male, young (<25 years), educated, 
employed, and white.16-21
Since 2011, cryptomarkets have been analysed 
through the digital traces they leave online,22 using 
automated software “crawlers” that collect publicly 
available data hosted on websites. The wealth of 
data available to researchers employing digital trace 
analysis includes the aliases and purported country 
level locations of drug vendors and the countries to 
which they are willing to make shipments. From each 
product listing posted by vendors on the marketplace, 
the drug type, price, and quantity can be determined, 
alongside customer feedback. Using these data, 
researchers have been able to track the growth of drug 
trading through the darknet,14 15 determining overall 
size, composition, and geographical distribution.20-25 
Feedback posted by customers are used by researchers 
as a proxy for estimating numbers of transactions and 
revenues generated by drug vendors.
In this study we analysed cryptomarket data 
to determine the efect of a speciic supply side 
intervention—the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 
ruling in October 2014 to reschedule hydrocodone 
combination products, the most popularly prescribed 
opioid analgesics in the US at that time.26 The 
administration’s decision to move hydrocodone 
combination products from schedule III to the more 
restrictive schedule II category1 substantially increased 
the diiculty with which patients could access these 
products by narrowing the circumstances in which 
they should be prescribed and removing the ability to 
obtain repeat prescriptions without a new script from 
a doctor.
Numerous studies conducted at regional and state 
levels indicate a substantial and sustained decrease 
in sales of hydrocodone combination products in the 
period immediately after the scheduling change.26-31 
Nationally, prescriptions for hydrocodone 
combination products decreased by 26% between 
June 2013 and June 2015.32 Restrictions to the 
supply of hydrocodone combination products had the 
unintended consequences of a displacement towards 
use of less potent, over-the-counter opioid products 
(eg, Tylenol, with codeine (McNeil Consumer 
Healthcare, PA))26-33 and switching to illicit market 
substitutes, such as heroin and fentanyl.29-34 One 
study34 suggested that the growing use of heroin 
and fentanyl in the US can be explained by the iron 
law of prohibition, whereby interventions to reduce 
supply, such as increased enforcement and changes 
to drug scheduling, lead to illicit markets dominated 
by higher potency products.
We investigated whether there is an association 
between the rescheduling of hydrocodone combination 
products and a subsequent sustained increase in 
trading of illicit prescription opioids on cryptomarkets, 
and whether, in line with the iron law of prohibition, any 
displaced illicit opioid market will enable access to more 
potent opioids in addition to hydrocodone equivalents.
Methods
To assess the impact of the US schedule change of 
hydrocodone combination products on the rates of 
listings (ie, products indicated as available for sale) 
and estimated sales for prescription opioids based on 
their location of origin, we used a unique longitudinal 
dataset from 31 diferent cryptomarkets that operated 
between September 2013 and July 2016. Setting 
these results against the cryptomarket sales for other 
prescription drugs and illicit opioids more generally, 
listed as originating from both within and outside the 
US, provided a comparator in relation to the schedule 
change in October 2014.
Data
We collected data using the web crawling software 
DATACRYPTO,35 which systematically looks for 
hyperlinks on cryptomarket web pages and downloads 
all the HTML pages it can ind on the cryptomarkets. 
When the software has inished collecting data, it 
switches to its scraping mode and extracts the relevant 
information from web pages (eg, title of listings, name 
of vendors, type of drug). An independent panel 
responsible for overseeing a report on the online sales 
of illicit drugs for the Netherlands Ministry of Justice 
and Security14 found DATACRYPTO to be accurate and 
suiciently reliable to inform on the current state of 
online illicit drug sales. The tool has also been found to 
have good validity by other researchers36 and has been 
used in many peer reviewed publications.14-40
Our analyses are based on data collected from 31 
cryptomarkets in operation between 12 September 
2013 and 18 July 2016, including all the largest English 
language sites (Alphabay, Nucleus, Dreammarket, 
Agora, Abraxas, Evolution, Silk Road 2 (Silk Road 
Reloaded), and SR1). Although some operational 
diferences exist across cryptomarkets, their basic 
infrastructure and function is broadly similar. We used 
DATACRYPTO to collect data typically once every two 
weeks, with each episode generating a full crawl of 
the market. As no human participants were involved, 
the institutional review board at the Université de 
Montréal deemed it not necessary to obtain an ethics 
certiicate from it for this research.
We extracted three pieces of information from each 
product listing placed by a vendor: the drug type on ofer, 
the country from where products would be shipped, 
and the number of customer feedbacks the listing had 
received in the 30 days before DATACRYPTO’s crawl. 
Owing to variability across markets, it was not possible 
to use information on price or product quantity. The 
number of customer feedbacks associated with a 
listing is an established proxy used by researchers 
to estimate the number of transactions generated by 
that listing.15 37 41 42 This proxy will undercount actual 
sales because not all customers leave feedback; in 
2016, researchers estimated that 71% of cryptomarket 
transactions generated customer feedback.14 We also 
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present our results using counts of total listings as 
well as only those listings that are “active” in having at 
least one customer feedback within the past 30 days, 
a strategy used by researchers to account for dormant 
or historical listings, as well as listings only recently 
placed on the marketplace.14 24
In total, 10 930 608 separate transactions were 
recorded in the dataset, of which we consider only 
those 2 968 217 (27.2%) that occurred in the 30 days 
before the date of each crawl by DATACRYPTO. These 
transactions are related to 2 686 396 product listings, 
of which 1 613 776 (60.1%) were classiied as drug 
related. More than a quarter (445 080 or 27.6%) of 
these drug listings were active.
Analysis
We focused on six product types: prescription opioids, 
prescription sedatives, prescription steroids, prescription 
stimulants, other prescription drugs, and illicit opioids 
(eg, heroin). Supplementary appendix 1 lists the 
individual drugs within each of these product types. 
We deined products as originating from within the 
US or elsewhere. Previous work24-43 has found that 
the main countries of origin for drugs traded through 
cryptomarkets were, in descending order: Europe 
(predominantly the United Kingdom, Germany, and 
the Netherlands), the US, Australia, and Canada. One 
study found that most listings originating in the US were 
available only domestically, whereas those from Europe 
were more likely to be available to international buyers.43
It is also not possible to report the absolute numbers 
of products or sales generated by cryptomarkets using 
the dataset we collected. Data collection crawls will 
always capture marketplace activity only imperfectly, 
and to an extent partially, and to reduce the uncertainty 
in our data, our results point to approximated 
estimates.15-40 Therefore, under the assumption that 
the data collected are a representative subsample of the 
total number of drug types available on cryptomarkets, 
our analysis focuses on the percentage that each of 
our six product types (see supplementary appendix 1) 
represents of total drug listings. Descriptive statistics 
for each drug group and area of origin are presented 
in supplementary appendix 2 and show that there was 
a large amount of variation in the percentage of sales 
for each grouping, and this can be directly attributable 
to diiculties in collecting or processing such data and 
the short term volatility of the marketplaces.
In addition to descriptive statistics, we present an 
interrupted time series analysis44 45 of the percentage 
of drug sales on each day of the data collection period, 
with a slope change at the day of the schedule change 















 represents the percentage of total 
transactions at time t attributable to each of six drug 
groupings, d, where a represents originating from the 
US or not, T represents the date of data collection in 
days from the beginning of the study (12 September 
2013), and X
t
 represents a dummy variable deined as 
zero before and 1 after the schedule change.
No other covariates were added to the model 
(eg, prices or package sizes) owing to constraints 
on data availability. To aid interpretation we scale 
and present parameters from the model on a yearly 
basis. The rationale for this is that if the rescheduling 
of prescription opioids caused an increase in the 
proportion of transactions for prescription opioids only 
within the US, this would be apparent by an increased 
rate of change of the percentage of that drug group 
with no other comparable change in other products or 
locations unafected by the scheduling change.
Data manipulation was undertaken using the 
database management system software MySQL (Oracle, 
CA), with the linear regression analysis conducted in 
Stata13 using Huber-White sandwich robust standard 
errors to account for a lack of normality in the 
dependents, heteroscedasticity, and data points with 
high leverage owing to the nature of the data collection 
process.
To identify which products were purchased we 
focused on the speciic subtypes of opioid prescription 
drugs (hydrocodone, oxycodone, fentanyl, and 
tramadol, with their various brand names listed in 
supplementary appendix 1). We plotted the proportion 
of total online sales of prescription opioids attributable 
to each speciic product over time.
Patient and public involvement
No patients or the public were involved in this 
research. As a result, no patient or the public informed 
the research questions and no patient was recruited. 
The public and select news organisations might be 
contacted to help disseminate the research indings.
Results
For each of the drug categories, igure 1 presents, on a 
quarterly basis, the percentage of transactions, active 
listings, and listings for products originating from 
within the US or from other countries. The only clear 
increase relating to transactions for prescription opioids 
was within the US. This increase irst occurred within 
the transaction measure, before a comparable efect 
on the number of active listings and inally translating 
through to the total number of listings (ig 1).
Sales of prescription sedatives increased, although 
this appears only for active listings and it is unclear 
whether the increase occurred within transactions (the 
most relevant measure of usage), which varies between 
7.5% and 11% of all drug transactions seemingly 
without pattern (ig 1). Results of the interrupted time 
series regressions, however, show that the rate of 
transactions involving prescription sedatives does not 
appear to have changed after the introduction of the 
new schedule (table 1).
 Coeicients were estimated on a daily percentage 
rate basis and converted to a rate over a full year 
(multiplying by 365) to aid interpretation.
The regression coeicients (E) and the standard 
error display the estimated change in the percentage 
of total transactions represented by each of the drug 
classiications and region of origin over a full year 
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(table 1). The point estimate for prescription sedatives 
from within the US of 4.468 before the schedule change 
therefore means that between 12 September 2013 and 
6 October 2014 the percentage of sales within the 
US represented by prescription sedatives increased 
by just less than 4.5 percentage points per year. The 
variation in the recorded percentage in each web 
crawl, however, leads to a standard error of just less 
than 3 percentage points and a P value of 0.13 (under 
the null hypothesis of zero) for prescription sedatives 
originating from the US. After the schedule change, 
there was no evidence of a change in transactions 
for prescription sedatives within the US. The same is 
true for almost all drug classiications, from all places 
of origin both before and after the schedule change, 
with the exception of illicit opioids, which showed a 
statistically signiicant increase before the schedule 
change followed by a decrease after change, although 
P values associated with the standard errors border 
on the 5% signiicance level within the US; and of 
prescription opioids within the US after the schedule 
change, with a statistically signiicant 4 percentage 
points increase in transactions.
These regression results can be used to estimate by 
how much the percentage of all drugs sales attributable 
to prescription opioids increased between the schedule 
change to the end of the study period. The marginal 
percentages suggest that without the schedule change 
the percentage of sales represented by prescription 
opioids on the 18 July 2016 would be 6.7% of all 
drug sales (95% conidence interval 3.7% to 9.6%). 
When the efect of the schedule date slope change is 
included, however, the proportion increases to 13.7% 
of all drugs sales (11.5% to 16.0%). This represents 
an approximate doubling of the percentage of the 
total drug sales through cryptomarkets within the US 
compared with no statistically signiicant change for 
the proportion of the same products outside the US, nor 
are there any meaningful changes to the proportion of 
sales for any other relevant drug category.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of transactions of 
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Fig 1 | Percentage of online drug transactions, active listings, and listings by drug category for products sold within 
the US compared with elsewhere, quarter 3 2013 to quarter 3 2016
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most commonly traded opioid products (also see 
supplementary appendix 1). Although the introduction 
of the new schedule does not seem to be accompanied 
by a change in the market share of hydrocodone, there 
is a slight increase in the three months before the 
schedule change—possibly due to widespread news 
coverage about the imminent reclassiication.32-46 
There also appears to be an increase in the proportion 
of oxycodone sales that slightly predates the schedule 
change but is most apparent in the quarter coinciding 
with the scheduling change (data was only collected 
in November and December of that period) and that 
which follows (January to March 2015). Over the longer 
term, however, the proportion of transactions that 
oxycodone products represent decreases, and fentanyl 
moves from being the least sold of the products to 
being the second most popular prescription opioid 
purchased from cryptomarket vendors based in the 
USA.
Discussion
The US Drug Enforcement Administration introduced 
a schedule change for hydrocodone combination 
products in October 2014. During the period of our 
study, October 2013 to July 2016, the percentage of 
total drug sales represented by prescription opioids 
in the US doubled from 6.7% to 13.7%, which 
corresponds to a yearly increase of 4 percentage points 
in market share. It is not possible to determine the 
location of buyers from cryptomarket data. We cannot 
know, for example, if a drug shipped from a vendor in 
Europe was purchased by a US customer. Nevertheless, 
cryptomarket users often prefer buying and selling from 
vendors in the same country; international shipments 
carry risks of loss, interception by oicials, and 
increased delivery times. A study of cryptomarkets in 
Australia found that local vendors were often preferred 
over international counterparts, despite substantially 
higher prices.24 Another study36 also noted the 
downward trends of international sales and therefore 
an increase in domestic sales, and yet another study47 
found that drug trading through cryptomarket is heavily 
constrained by oline geography. This preference for 
domestic trading, combined with the relatively large 
numbers of US drug vendors trading in cryptomarkets, 
leads us to presume that most sales of prescription 
drugs by US vendors will be sold to customers based 
in the US. Conversely, most transactions generated by 
non-US vendors will not be sold to US customers.
The results of our interrupted time series suggest the 
possibility of a causal relation between the schedule 
change and the percentage of sales represented by 
prescription opioids on cryptomarkets. Our analysis 
cannot rule out other possible causal explanatory 
factors, but our results are consistent with the 
possibility that the schedule change might have 
directly contributed to the changes we observed in the 
supply of illicit opioids. This possibility is reinforced 
by the fact that the increased availability and sales 
of prescription opioids on cryptomarkets in the US 
after the schedule change was not replicated for 
cryptomarkets elsewhere.
Table 1 | Estimated yearly percentage point change in share of total drug sales 
represented by each drug category* and according to region of origin
Variables
Prescription drugs
Illicit opioidsSedatives Opioids Steroids Stimulants Other
Within US
Before change:
 β coeicient 4.468 2.383 −0.789 1.914 −5.904 10.027
 SE 2.955 4.002 1.080 2.106 5.585 4.899
 P value 0.13 0.55 0.47 0.36 0.29 <0.05
Ater change:
 β coeicient 0.797 3.946 −0.166 −0.197 0.948 −4.185
 SE 0.937 1.269 0.343 0.668 0.618 2.042
 P value 0.40 <0.01 0.63 0.77 0.13 <0.05
Outside US
Before change
 β coeicient 1.725 1.598 0.300 −0.460 0.456 5.242
 SE 3.419 1.323 0.871 1.015 0.515 1.789
 P value 0.61 0.23 0.73 0.65 0.38 <0.001
Ater change:
 β coeicient −1.496 −0.162 −0.235 0.218 −0.166 −0.679
 SE 0.898 0.348 0.229 0.267 0.204 0.470
 P value 0.10 0.64 0.31 0.42 0.42 0.15
*Coeicients were estimated on a daily percentage rate basis and converted to a rate over a full year (multiplying 
























































Fig 2 | Percentage of online transactions for prescription 
opioids sold within the US compared with elsewhere, 
quarter 3 2013 to quarter 3 2016
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Our results are consistent with the possibility of 
demand led increases. The irst increase observed for 
prescription opioids was for actual sales (ig 1); with 
increases for active listings, and then all listings, 
following. One explanation is that cryptomarket 
vendors perceived an increase in demand and 
responded by placing more listings for prescription 
opioids and thereby increasing supply. Our results 
are also consistent with the iron law of prohibition34 
insofar as we identiied the largest sales increases 
for more potent prescription opioids—speciically, 
oxycodone and fentanyl. Cryptomarkets may function 
as a supply gateway48: customers who initially sought 
out illicit hydrocodone on cryptomarkets after the 
schedule change might then have favoured more 
potent opioids available on the marketplace.
The shift towards users accessing drugs through 
cryptomarkets might make it more diicult to reduce 
the harms associated with prescription opioids; it was 
possible to control the quality and quantity of legal 
prescription drugs used. With the move to an illicit 
market it becomes more diicult to track individual 
use of prescription opioids, and to ofer treatment and 
help to users. The iron law of prohibition also suggests 
that the move to an illicit market is associated with 
use of increasingly potent drugs. We found that users 
were irst buying oxycodone followed by fentanyl. Drug 
users adapt to their changing environment and are 
able to source drugs from new distribution channels 
if needed, even if that means by illegal means. In a 
context of high demand, supply side interventions 
are therefore likely to push opioid users towards illicit 
supplies, which may increase the harms associated 
with their drug use and make monitoring more diicult. 
These problems may be minimised, however, through 
the implementation of additional, demand oriented 
policy responses. One researcher49 50 provides multiple 
alternative and complementary strategies to supply 
side interventions that focus on the demand for illicit 
drugs: providing reliable treatment options, dealing 
with over-prescribing, and making more information 
available about the nature and dangers of prescription 
opioid use to reduce the associated stigmas. These 
alternatives are known to have an impact on drug 
use and could be employed before and after schedule 
changes to alleviate their negative impacts.
Limitations of this study
The main limitation of our study concerns causal 
mechanisms. Although our results show an increase in 
sales of prescription opioids on cryptomarkets after the 
schedule change, contemporaneous factors might also 
have played a causal role. These could include the efect 
of other public policies enacted over the same period; 
however, we do not know of any other policies that 
were implemented as widely as the Drug Enforcement 
Administration’s schedule change.31 32 Other potential 
causal factors include a more general increase in 
demand unrelated to the schedule change in the US, or a 
more general awareness among this group of drug users 
that they can source prescription drugs illicitly through 
cryptomarkets. While these potential changes cannot be 
ruled out, it is unlikely that they occurred at the same 
time as the schedule change. Furthermore, the lat 
trend we identiied in illicit sales across all other drug 
categories, even for those drugs that would be likely to 
appeal to a similar type of user, suggests that a general 
awareness of cryptomarkets was not increased at the 
same time within the US population of drug users.
A second limitation concerns the validity of the data 
collected using DATACRYPTO software. Researchers 
can never be certain that a web crawler has obtained 
all of the content on a cryptomarket during a data 
sweep. Regardless, no concerns have arisen through 
multiple evaluations of the DATACRYPTO dataset. 
Moreover, repeated evaluations of data collected 
using DATACRYPTO are consistent with each other, 
thereby reducing the likelihood that the software was 
interrupted while web crawling.
A third limitation is that our assessment of the 
geographical source and destination of drugs based 
on public information cannot be independently 
conirmed. A vendor could advertise shipping from 
the US but be located in Mexico, Canada, or elsewhere. 
The customer feedback system limits this possibility 
as buyers would quickly feedback about increased 
delivery times of drugs received from another country. 
Cryptomarkets are competitive settings8-37 and vendors 
who cheat and act opportunistically are not likely to 
remain active for extended periods and are therefore 
unlikely to make up a sizeable proportion of our vendor 
population. Similarly, it is possible that some US based 
vendors shipped their drugs to customers in other 
countries. Recent trends analysis by researchers36-47 
as well as qualitative analysis of forums show that 
customers are reticent to order from foreign vendors. 
We do not therefore expect our estimates to be impacted 
substantially by these limitations.
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